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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [NATO](#) [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [KNNP](#) [GM](#) [IR](#) [RU](#) [AF](#)  
SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HEUSGEN ON AFGHANISTAN,  
MIDDLE EAST, IRAN, DETAINEES, RUSSIA, NUKES AND BALKANS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILIP D. MURPHY. REASONS: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Chancellery National Security Advisor Christoph Heusgen told EUR A/S Phil Gordon and Ambassador Murphy in a November 10 meeting in Berlin that Germany strongly preferred that the proposed international conference on Afghanistan be held outside the country to make it easier to press Karzai to commit to the necessary reforms. On the Middle East, Heusgen thought Netanyahu had to do much more on settlements if there was to be any hope of re-starting negotiations. On Iran, Heusgen hoped for some conclusion by early next month on whether the diplomatic track was going to bear fruit so that this issue could be discussed at the December 10 EU Summit. Heusgen said Germany was ready to discuss taking Guantanamo detainees, but stressed the importance of dealing directly with the Ministry of Interior and keeping the negotiations confidential. While arguing for being rhetorically supportive of the Medvedev European Security proposal, Heusgen shared U.S. skepticism about a new treaty and an OSCE Summit hosted by Kazakhstan. Heusgen distanced the Chancellery from the proposal to remove all remaining tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, stressing the need to get reciprocal cuts from the Russians. Also discussed was CFE, the Macedonian name issue and Bosnia. END SUMMARY.

#### AFGHANISTAN

¶2. (C) Heusgen confirmed that Germany would only announce additional resources for Afghanistan after the proposed international conference, which Chancellor Merkel and UK PM Brown are now proposing for January 28 in London. He said the conference is key because this is where the Germans expect the Afghan government to make specific commitments to improve governance and to gradually begin assuming responsibility from the international community. President Karzai had to be put under international pressure to perform according to prescribed benchmarks. Toward that end, the Chancellery felt strongly that the conference should be held outside of Afghanistan and not on Karzai's "home turf." Heusgen complained that the German and U.S. embassies in Kabul are on "a different track" and pushing for a conference in Kabul. It was important to "make up our minds" quickly on the way ahead. If the conference slipped to February or later, and the UK were no longer able to host it in view of the upcoming parliamentary elections there, then Germany would be willing to.

¶3. (C) Heusgen at first expressed concern that the U.S. would undermine international leverage on Karzai by rolling out its new strategy and resource commitments before he made any reciprocal commitments to reform. Gordon assured him that the formal U.S. roll-out would only come after the November 19 inauguration, where Karzai is expected to "say the right things" in his inaugural address. Gordon also highlighted the need to coordinate on the U.S. roll-out to avoid the perception that the U.S. was "Americanizing" the

international effort in Afghanistan. It should be announced as a common strategy and not as a U.S. strategy to which the Allies then respond. Heusgen agreed in principle, but indicated that Germany would stick to its approach of holding back on any announcement of new commitments until after the international conference.

#### MIDDLE EAST

14. (C) Referring to the Secretary's recent public statements on settlements, Heusgen said that Germany "perceives this differently" and thought Netanyahu needed "to do more" in order bring the Palestinians to the negotiating table. With Palestinians in East Jerusalem getting notices from Israeli authorities that their houses will be destroyed, it would be "suicide" for President Abbas to move under the current circumstances. Heusgen said he could not fathom why Netanyahu did not understand this. He suggested pressuring Netanyahu by linking favorable UNSC treatment of the Goldstone Report to Israel committing to a complete stop in settlement activity. Gordon said that making a direct linkage between the two would almost certainly be counterproductive, but agreed that it was worth pointing out to the Israelis that their policy on settlements was making it difficult for their friends to hold the line in the UNSC. Heusgen said this certainly would be an issue when Netanyahu and "half of his cabinet" visit Berlin on November 30 for bilateral government consultations.

#### IRAN

15. (C) Heusgen praised the U.S. for its patience with Iran,  
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but noted that at some point, it would be necessary to move to the second track in order to maintain credibility. Heusgen said that he and his British counterpart agreed that ideally, there would be some conclusion on this by early next month so that the way ahead could be discussed by EU leaders at their summit on December 10. Gordon agreed that there had to be a time limit, noting that President Obama had given the Iranians "by the end of the year" to respond favorably. He also noted that the U.S. could support a Turkish role in the proposed exchange of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel if that would make it easier for Iran to accept the deal. Gordon indicated, however, that Turkish PM Erdogan needed to be careful about losing credibility in Washington if he continued to make comments about Ahmadinejad being his "friend."

#### GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

16. (C) Heusgen noted that now that the Bundestag election was past, Germany was ready to help on detainees, as it had promised earlier. He advised the USG to work directly with new Interior Minister de Maiziere, rather than going first to MFA and the Chancellery, which had irritated de Maiziere's predecessor and made him less willing to cooperate. In this regard, he thought that it would be helpful if DHS Secretary Napolitano made direct contact with de Maiziere. Heusgen also suggested that the discussions be kept confidential until MOI had come to a decision on which detainees to accept and in which state they would be settled. Premature public disclosure could doom the whole initiative. Heusgen said that Uighurs would be "too difficult," but that Germany could probably accept "2-3 others." (Comment: The reluctance about Uighurs is due to the expected negative reaction of the Chinese government. End Comment.)

#### EUROPEAN SECURITY PROPOSAL AND POSSIBLE OSCE SUMMIT

17. (C) Heusgen said that while the West should try to react positively to whatever the Russians propose in advancing the Medvedev European security proposal, nothing should be accepted that would undermine current European security institutions, including the OSCE. He shared Gordon's

misgivings about a proposed treaty. He was also skeptical about the idea of an OSCE Summit in Astana, agreeing that Kazakhstan's human rights record and the lack of substantive agenda items made it unattractive. Heusgen suggested that an OSCE Summit be offered to the Russians on the condition they solve the frozen conflict in Transnistria, which he said Moscow could accomplish "in about a month."

#### TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

¶18. (C) In response to Gordon's question about how the government planned to take forward the commitment in the coalition agreement to seek the removal of all remaining nuclear weapons from Germany, Heusgen distanced the Chancellery from the proposal, claiming that this had been forced upon them by FM Westerwelle. Heusgen said that from his perspective, it made no sense to unilaterally withdraw "the 20" tactical nuclear weapons still in Germany while Russia maintains "thousands" of them. It would only be worth it if both sides drew down. Gordon noted that it was important to think through all the potential consequences of the German proposal before going forward. For example, a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and perhaps from Belgium and the Netherlands could make it very difficult politically for Turkey to maintain its own stockpile, even though it was still convinced of the need to do so.

#### CFE

¶19. (C) Gordon asked for Heusgen's views on a German CFE paper that had been delivered to the State Department just a few days earlier. Heusgen said he did not know anything about it, claiming that he did not follow this issue closely or "believe in it." He noted that MFA "loved this disarmament business," which was okay, but it had to be balanced or the "Russians will sit there and laugh."

#### MACEDONIAN NAME ISSUE

¶10. (C) Gordon briefed Heusgen on the current state of the negotiations, noting that the two key issues were the geographic modifier and international usage. Heusgen noted that the Chancellor knew PM Macedonian Gruevski through their common membership in the European People's Party and would be willing to engage him on this issue if that would be helpful.

#### BOSNIA

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¶11. (C) Heusgen revealed that Serb President Tadic was coming to Berlin the week of November 16 for consultations. He noted that while Tadic always claimed to be tough on Republika Srpska PM Dodic, he needed to be tougher. While expressing pessimism about whether it would ever be possible to turn Bosnia into a "working state," Heusgen agreed it was important to keep trying.

MURPHY